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ABSTRACT 
In the social debate about animal welfare we can identify three different views about how 
animals should be raised and how their welfare should be judged: (1) the view that 
animals should be raised under conditions that promote good biological functioning in the 
sense of health, growth and reproduction, (2) the view that animals should be raised in 
ways that minimise suffering and promote contentment, and (3) the view that animals 
should be allowed to lead relatively natural lives. When attempting to assess animal 
welfare, different scientists select different criteria, reflecting one or more of these value-
dependent views. Even when ostensibly covering all three views, scientists may differ in 
what they treat as inherently important versus only instrumentally important, and their 
selection of variables may be further influenced by a desire to use measures that are 
scientifically respected and can be scored objectively. Value assumptions may also enter 
animal welfare assessment at the farm and group level (1) when empirical data provide 
insufficient guidance on important issues, (2) when we need to weigh conflicting interests 
of different animals, and (3) when we need to weigh conflicting evidence from different 
variables. Although value assumptions cannot be eliminated from animal welfare 
assessment, they can be made more explicit as the first step in creating animal welfare 
assessment tools. Different value assumptions could lead to different welfare assessment 





When Dawkins (1980) published her book Animal Suffering, subtitled The Science of Animal Welfare, 
much of the science she described was experimental. In experimental science, we can study single 
variables or treatments, with other variables either controlled or included in a planned or balanced 
manner. Furthermore, in experimental science we usually examine the average effects of the variables on 
a reasonably homogeneous sample of animals, and the individual differences in response tend to be 
treated as sampling error to be minimised in order to make the central tendency more clear. 
Today, however, animal welfare science is being asked to take on a much more complex task: not 
controlled experimentation, but the assessment of animal welfare at the farm and group level. Here the 
challenge is very different. Instead of single variables and controlled treatments, we often need to 
consider a range of diverse variables and perhaps combine these in some manner in a scoring system or 
evaluation. Instead of examining average effects, we may need to deal with quite different responses by 
different animals and somehow combine these into an overall assessment of the animals making up the 
group or farm. 
As a further complication, welfare assessment tools are being developed for very different purposes: in 
some cases to allow retail and restaurant companies to assure customers that welfare standards are 
being followed within conventional confinement systems; in other cases to identify niche products from 
animals raised in non-confinement systems; in other cases, to demonstrate compliance with legally 
required minimum welfare standards. In each of these cases, the stated goal may be to “assess animal 
welfare”, but the actual purpose, and sometimes the underlying philosophy, may be quite different. 
In this complex environment, it will be especially important to be clear on what science can and cannot 
contribute, and on the interplay of science and value assumptions in assessing animal welfare at the farm 
and group level. The purpose of this paper is to set out some vocabulary and concepts to help in this 
process. 
A valuable model for this task is provided by a unique study by Brunk and colleagues (1991) on the 
interplay of empirical data and value assumptions in risk assessment. Their study examined a risk 
assessment hearing for the pesticide Alachlor, with company scientists arguing that the pesticide is safe 
whereas regulatory scientists argued the opposite. Brunk et al (1991) found that the disagreement, which 
the scientists tended to view as a purely technical issue, arose mainly from different value assumptions 
underlying the scientists’ assessment. In analysing the conflict, Brunk et al developed a useful taxonomy, 
which I largely follow in this paper, of the ways in which value assumptions can become embedded in 
scientific evaluation. 
Welfare assessment gone awry? 
To make this rather abstract exercise more concrete, let us consider a recent example where scientists 
differed strongly in an assessment of animal welfare. In 1997, a scientific committee created by the 
European Union reviewed the literature on the welfare of intensively kept pigs, and asked (among other 
questions) whether welfare problems are caused by “gestation stalls” — the stalls where sows are often 
kept, unable to walk or turn around during most of pregnancy. The review concluded that: “Some serious 
welfare problems for sows persist even in the best stall-housing system” (von Borell et al 1997, section 
5.2.11). With this review in hand, the European Union adopted a ban on gestation stalls as of 2013 
(Anonymous 2001). 
Shortly thereafter, a group of Australian scientists reviewed much the same literature and asked much the 
same question, but came up with essentially the opposite conclusion, claiming that: “Both individual 
[including stalls] and group housing can meet the welfare requirements of pigs” (Barnett et al 2001, p 13). 
The swine industry in the United States has used that review to argue that there is no scientific basis for 
eliminating the gestation stall. 
Both of these reviews were done with great thoroughness by very accomplished scientists, and each 
group may well have felt they were doing the best and most objective job possible. What, then, should we 
conclude when two groups of scientists, having access to much the same scientific literature, reach 
opposite conclusions? Is there a fundamental problem with the field of animal welfare science? Is the field 
less scientific than had been claimed? An exploration of this conflict will help to shed light on the interplay 
of value assumptions and empirical information in the assessment of animal welfare at the farm and 
group level. 
Three views of animal welfare 
During recent decades, while animal welfare science was emerging as a distinct field, three cultural 
developments influenced societal views about the proper treatment of farm animals and, hence, about 
how animal welfare should be judged. One development was the remarkable change in animal agriculture 
that has occurred since 1950, whereby certain traditional, semi-outdoor production methods were largely 
replaced by more industrialised, intensive, indoor methods, and the pursuit of highly efficient production 
became the guiding principle of animal agriculture. Roughly the same 50 years saw a remarkable 
increase in humanitarian attitudes toward animals in the West, perhaps resulting from growing scientific 
knowledge of animals, the trend for an increasingly urban population to be exposed to pets rather than 
farm animals, and the role of the media in making the lives of wild animals accessible to people as never 
before. The result has been a striking increase in the amount of attention and sympathy paid to animals, 
at least in the European and English-speaking countries of the West. The third development has been a 
degree of backlash against industrialisation and technology, evidenced today by distrust of big business, 
global trade and genetic engineering. This trend includes calls for a return to more agrarian and 
ecological forms of agriculture including smaller, traditional farms and less technological tampering with 
nature. 
These three developments appear to have contributed to, or at least reinforced, three different views 
about the welfare of farm animals (Duncan & Fraser 1997; Fraser et al 1997). One view emphasises the 
biological functioning of the animal in the sense of health, growth, and productivity. According to this view, 
newer production methods, however unnatural and restrictive they may seem, are good for animal 
welfare as long as the animals are healthy, growing, and reproducing well. Thus, one commentator 
defended intensive production systems because: 
“on balance ... the animal is better cared for; it is certainly much freer from disease and 
attack by its mates; it receives much better attention from the attendants, is sure of 
shelter and bedding and a reasonable amount of good food and water.” (Taylor 1972) 
A second view emphasises the “affective states” of animals — pain, suffering, and other feelings and 
emotions. According to this view: 
“The welfare of managed animals is dependent upon the degree to which they can adapt 
without suffering to the environments provided by man.” (Carpenter 1980) 
Hence, production methods should be judged on the basis of how happy the animals are, or conversely 
how much the animals are caused to suffer. 
A third view is that animals should be allowed to live in as natural circumstances as possible, where they 
can express their normal behaviour. For example, one critic of intensive production systems urged: 
“Let [farm animals] see the sun just once, get away from the murderous roar of the fans. 
Let them get to breathe fresh air for once, instead of manure gas”. (Anonymous 1989) 
These divergent views of animal welfare constitute what Brunk et al (1991) call “value frameworks” in the 
sense of a coherent set of values which may be closely connected to an individual’s world view and 
convictions. The first view, emphasising biological functioning, is commonly heard among those who are 
involved in animal production (te Velde et al 2002), the quote being from a veterinarian working with 
livestock. The second view, emphasising suffering and other affective states, is commonly heard among 
humanitarians concerned about animal welfare (Fraser et al 1997); the quote is from a church-based 
committee of theologians and other concerned citizens. The third view, emphasising natural living, was 
found to be common among consumers of animal products by te Velde et al (2002); the quote is from 
writer Astrid Lindgren whose popular novels often glorified life lived close to nature and free from the 
constraints imposed by modern society. 
Value frameworks in the scientific study of animal welfare 
It would be comforting to think that science could simply set things straight by replacing these different, 
value-dependent views of animal welfare with objective data about what is truly better for animals. In fact, 
however, scientists tend to bring to animal welfare assessment much the same three value frameworks 
outlined above. Thus McGlone (1993) advocated that biological functioning is definitive of animal welfare, 
and criticised attempts to relate animal welfare to subjective states such as suffering: 
“an animal is in a poor state of welfare only when physiological systems are disturbed to 
the point that survival or reproduction are impaired.” 
In contrast, Duncan (1993) saw affective states as definitive of animal welfare: 
“... neither health nor lack of stress nor fitness is necessary and/or sufficient to conclude 
that an animal has good welfare. Welfare is dependent on what animals feel.” 
And Kiley-Worthington (1989), emphasising natural living, claimed: 
“in order to avoid suffering, it is necessary over a period of time for the animal to perform 
all the behaviors in its repertoire...” 
These three views of animal welfare are by no means mutually exclusive; indeed, advocates of any one 
sometimes seem to assume that their own view of welfare would encompass the others, inasmuch as 
they are important or knowable. Nonetheless, the three views represent three different areas of emphasis 
which can lead scientists to use quite different criteria in assessing animal welfare. 
A careful reading of the European and Australian reviews of the welfare of pigs shows that the two groups 
of scientists differed in the value frameworks they used. The Australian reviewers saw biological 
functioning as the key to animal welfare, putting special emphasis on “relative changes in biological ... 
responses and corresponding decreases in fitness” including “widely accepted criteria of poor welfare 
such as health, immunology, injuries, growth rate, and nitrogen balance” (Barnett et al 2001, p 3). They 
acknowledged that affective states play a role in animal welfare inasmuch as they are part of the animal’s 
apparatus for survival and reproduction, but they assumed that all risks to welfare should have 
“consequent effects on fitness variables such as growth, reproduction, injury, and health” (p 3). 
In contrast, the European reviewers emphasised affective states directly, claiming that, “Suffering is one 
of the most important aspects of poor welfare and we should investigate the existence of good or bad 
feelings wherever possible when trying to assess welfare” (von Borell et al 1997, section 1.2). Thus, they 
included in their assessment of animal welfare “the effects of fear and the behavioural and physiological 
consequences of lack of control, especially frustration” (section 1.2), without assuming that these 
problems would necessarily affect functioning-based variables such as growth, reproduction, injury and 
health. They also saw the opportunity to carry out natural behaviour as beneficial to welfare, stating that 
“sow welfare will be worse in conditions where exploration of a complex environment, rooting in a soft 
substratum and manipulation of materials such as straw are not possible” (section 5.2.1); and they saw 
high levels of abnormal behaviour as indicative of poor welfare, again without requiring consequent 
effects on health and other functioning-based variables. It was, in part, evidence of the animals’ affective 
states, natural behaviour and abnormal behaviour that led the European reviewers to conclude that 
serious welfare problems occur in even the best stall systems. 
Thus, the different conclusions reached by the European and Australian reviews were due, at least in 
part, to the different value frameworks adopted by the groups, which led to different criteria for assessing 
animal welfare. 
The mouldy bread and dry frog errors 
However, it seems very unsatisfactory to have scientists drawing opposite conclusions because they 
insist on using different criteria to assess the key concept in their field. Meteorologists would be in chaos 
if they used conflicting ways of measuring temperature, or cytologists if they disagreed on what a cell is. 
To make sense of this, let us consider the “mouldy bread error”: 
In a (fictional) nutrition laboratory, scientists decided to conduct a scientific assessment of 
bread quality in order to help consumers to buy good bread. They were equipped to 
measure standard nutrients such as protein and minerals, but they did not have an assay 
for mould-derived toxins, and they were sceptical of the less objective methods 
commonly used to assess freshness, texture, and flavour. Noting that nutrients are 
important components of bread quality, they combined their various nutrient 
measurements into a “bread quality index” and showed (scientifically, and using the most 
objective measures available) that stale, mouldy bread is equal in quality to freshly baked 
bread. 
In this anecdote, the scientists failed to distinguish between scientific concepts and socially constructed 
concepts. Concepts such as viscosity and metabolic rate are scientific concepts invented within, and 
taking their meaning from, a field of science. Such concepts may, of course, come to be used in popular 
culture. For instance, an overweight person might blame his corpulence on a low metabolic rate; whether 
this is true is an empirical question which a physiologist could answer by certain measurements. 
In contrast, concepts such as the quality of bread or the health of a person are socially constructed: they 
arose in society and have meaning in everyday speech independent of their adoption into scientific 
discourse. Science can, of course, be applied to these topics, but if scientists try to define socially 
constructed concepts in terms of scientific variables, they must be careful not to miss or misconstrue the 
social meaning of the term, or their research may prove irrelevant to its intended social purpose. 
Clearly animal welfare is a socially constructed concept. It was part of social discourse before it became 
the subject of scientific research, and it is widely used in everyday speech to refer to the quality of life of 
animals, especially when ethical concerns about animals’ quality of life are being discussed. Hence, when 
scientists attempt to assess animal welfare, they need to ensure that their scientific measures reflect the 
socially constructed meaning of the term (Tannenbaum 1991; Stafleu et al 1996). 
If, however, we treat animal welfare exactly like bread quality, we might make the dry frog error: 
In an (also fictional) bedroom, a young boy who had caught a frog as a pet wanted to 
give the frog the best possible care. Believing that the frog would be cold and tired after 
living in swamps and eating flies, he tucked the frog into his own warm, dry bed with a 
handful of peppermints. 
The dry frog anecdote reminds us that animal welfare is unlike bread quality in that animals themselves 
have certain interests, and these provide the ultimate criteria for animal welfare. Through scientific 
knowledge, we can make better judgements about what is good or bad for animals, and thus improve on 
uninformed opinion or simplistic extrapolation from humans to other species. Hence, our ways of 
assessing animal welfare need to be scientifically informed, while also needing to capture the social 
meaning of the term. 
As we have seen, however, animal welfare actually carries different social meanings. Ethicists, 
humanitarians, and consumers tend to emphasise affective states such as suffering and frustration, 
together with the opportunity to live a relatively natural life. By emphasising these elements in their 
assessment of animal welfare, the European reviewers helped to align their analysis with this widely held 
social meaning of the term, thus avoiding the mouldy bread error. The Australian reviewers, seeming 
particularly mindful of the dry frog error, emphasised the danger of relying on mere public perceptions of 
animal welfare, noting that “public perceptions may result in difficulties with the concept of confinement 
housing ... [but] ... the issue of public perception should not be confused with welfare” (p 13). In relying on 
functioning-based variables such as “growth, reproduction, injury, and health” (p 3), the Australian 
reviewers adopted a meaning of the term that does not correspond well to the social meaning assumed 
by ethicists, humanitarians and consumers, although te Velde et al (2002) found it to be a common view 
of welfare among livestock producers. 
Inherently versus instrumentally important variables 
Even when scientists ostensibly include all three value frameworks in assessing animal welfare, they may 
differ in whether they treat a given aspect as inherently important or merely instrumentally important. For 
those who adopt a natural-living view of animal welfare, the ability to perform natural behaviour is an 
inherently important element of welfare. This emphasis is reflected, for example, in the “Five Freedoms”, 
which require freedom to perform most types of natural behaviour as a key element of welfare, 
comparable to freedom from injury and disease (Webster 1994). From this viewpoint, housing sows so 
that they cannot walk, turn around, explore, or root in a natural substrate during most of pregnancy would, 
in and of itself, constitute a welfare problem. 
The Australian reviewers, in adopting functioning-based criteria for assessing welfare, evidently viewed 
freedom to perform natural behaviour as being only instrumentally important; that is, the ability to walk 
would be important for welfare if (but only if) it led to measurable benefits in terms of health, reproduction, 
or similar variables. The evidence, they noted, showed that biological functioning measures are, in 
general, roughly as positive for sows in stalls as for sows in loose housing. Thus, according to their 
criteria, sow welfare is not significantly impaired by an inability to walk, turn, and perform natural 
behaviour. However, their approach would not fit with the value framework of those who see natural living 
as inherently important for welfare. 
A similar issue arises over the role played by the affective states of animals in their welfare. Several 
positions can be discerned in the literature: 
1) that affective states are inherently important for animal welfare and should be studied directly 
(Duncan 1993, 1996); 
2) that affective states are inherently important but cannot readily be studied, leaving us to use 
biological functioning measures as the most practical approach (Gonyou 1993); 
3) that affective states are inherently important but are so closely tied to biological functioning that 
measures of biological functioning should suffice to identify problems involving affective states 
(Baxter 1983); and 
4) that animal welfare depends only on biological functioning (McGlone 1993); affective states are 
not inherently important, but may be instrumentally important inasmuch as they affect biological 
functioning. 
The European reviewers clearly saw affective states as important inherently, not only instrumentally, for 
animal welfare. Hence, they took signs that sows are “frustrated” in stalls (section 5.2.2) and that sows 
find stalls “aversive” (5.2.1) as evidence of welfare problems in stalls. The Australian reviewers 
incorporated affective states in a different manner. They noted that “animal emotions” play a role in 
animal welfare “as they would have evolved on the basis of their survival values and contribution to 
biological fitness” (p 3). However, by assuming that all threats to welfare should have effects on “fitness” 
variables, the Australian reviewers appeared to view affective states as only instrumentally important for 
welfare inasmuch as they affect biological functioning (position 4, above), or inherently important for 
animal welfare but adequately captured by functioning-based measures (position 3). In either case, the 
Australian reviewers, unlike the European ones, did not look to evidence of negative affective states as 
primary criteria of welfare problems, and this contributed to their conclusion that gestation stalls “can meet 
the welfare requirements” of the animals. 
Objectivity and scientific respectability 
Concerns about objectivity and scientific respectability may also influence the selection of variables for 
animal welfare assessment. Scientists generally strive for objectivity, in the sense of making 
measurements that represent the object under study, not the subject (person) making the measurement. 
Variables such as growth rate, survival, and incidence of infectious diseases can generally be scored in 
objective ways yielding strong agreement between different observers, and animal welfare scientists have 
often recommended the use of such objective measures wherever possible. For example, Grandin 
(1998), in selecting variables to assess the humaneness of animal handling at slaughter plants, favoured 
measures that can be readily scored in an objective manner. 
On the other hand, there is much less consensus on how to assess affective states such as pain, 
frustration, and suffering. For example, quantitative assessment of pain is often done by subjective 
scaling methods which are open to substantial disagreement among observers (Beynen et al 1987). 
Moreover, during much of the 20th century, influential scientists claimed that the affective states of 
animals, not being open to direct observation, fall outside the realm of scientific study (Burkhardt 1997). 
Today, despite considerable scientific interest in the affective states of animals (eg Panksepp 1998), the 
subject remains relatively new and continues to evoke scepticism among some scientists. 
In our case study, the Australian reviewers appeared to attach substantial importance to the objectivity of 
the measures they used, and they remarked that their reliance on functioning-based criteria “affords this 
approach credibility within scientific circles”. In so doing, however, the Australian reviewers may have 
sacrificed capturing some of the widely held social meaning of the term. In contrast, the European 
reviewers, in embracing measures reflecting affective states and natural behaviour, appeared to come 
much closer to the social meaning of the term as understood by ethicists, humanitarians and consumers, 
but they may have incurred the scepticism of those who view such measures as less objective or not 
scientifically respectable. 
It is important to distinguish objectivity in applying measures versus objectivity in selecting the measures 
to be applied. A group of measures may be applied in a highly objective way, but the selection of 
variables is, nonetheless, likely to reflect the value framework of those making the selection. There is a 
risk that scientists will confuse these two aspects of objectivity, and claim that because the variables they 
use to assess animal welfare can be scored in an objective and quantitative way, therefore the 
assessment of animal welfare is objective in the sense of being free from value assumptions. In reality, 
although each variable may be scored objectively, values play a key role in the selection, weighting, and 
interpretation of the variables. 
Inherently normative versus conditionally normative issues 
In their analysis, Brunk et al (1991) also distinguished between “conditionally normative” and “inherently 
normative” issues in risk assessment. In the former, values become involved simply because the relevant 
scientific data are not sufficiently precise. In the Alachlor study, for example, there were no definitive data 
on whether the pesticide caused genetic mutation; in the absence of such data, the assessors had to 
decide how to assign the benefit of the doubt. By contrast, in “inherently normative” cases, the need to 
apply values could not, even in theory, be resolved by empirical data. For example, scientists defending 
Alachlor insisted that the compound is safe if handled with appropriate gloves; regulatory scientists noted 
that many farm workers do not have access to such gloves. The panel, therefore, had to decide whether 
to base their ruling on the conditions specified on the label or on the conditions likely to occur on actual 
farms. While empirical data (for example, about the number of farm workers with access to the necessary 
gloves) might help to clarify the gravity of the problem, the issue remains inherently a value-based 
decision. 
Both conditionally and inherently normative issues arise in animal welfare assessment. Conditionally 
normative issues often arise when we deal with single variables. If the evidence is unclear on whether 
hens need 10 cm or 12 cm of trough space in order to eat simultaneously, we may decide to err on the 
high or low side of the range, depending on whose interests we want to protect. With better data, we 
might have a definitive answer and not need to apply a value-dependent judgement. 
Inherently normative issues are likely to occur in welfare assessment, firstly, when we need to balance 
different effects on different animals. For example, group housing of pregnant sows allows all animals to 
socialise, but a few may suffer from excessive aggression. In this case, we need to decide what priority to 
attach to different classes of animals: the majority, the most vulnerable, the most productive etc. Similarly, 
with delayed weaning of piglets we may have to balance the nutritional benefits received by the piglets 
against any costs incurred by the mothers. When we compare costs and benefits for a single animal, we 
can sometimes use preference research or other methods to help understand the animal’s own interests 
and priorities; but where different animals have conflicting interests, there is no purely objective way to 
decide which party to favour. Secondly, inherently normative issues may arise when incommensurable 
variables lead toward different conclusions. For example, hens on pasture have more freedom of 
movement; hens in cages may have more freedom from coccidiosis. Which is more important for the 
hens’ welfare? Formal scaling systems may help up to a point in combining variables (Scott et al 2001), 
but if scientists and others differ fundamentally in the weight they attach to different aspects of animal 
welfare, no scaling methods will prevent value assumptions from being invoked (often unwittingly) in 
weighing different attributes. As noted above, these two cases — weighing conflicting interests of different 
animals, and weighing conflicting but incommensurable variables — are complications that arise in 
assessing animal welfare particularly at the farm and group level. 
 
Conclusions and implications for animal welfare 
Brunk et al (1991) criticised what they called the “classical model” of risk assessment, whereby the 
assessment of risk is perceived as a purely objective and scientific task, which is then followed by an 
ethical decision about whether the level of risk is acceptable. Some scientists have proposed a similar 
model for the study of animal welfare. For example, Broom (1991, p 4168) suggests that welfare “can be 
measured in a scientific way that is independent of moral considerations”, and that ethical decisions can 
then be made about whether the situation is morally acceptable. Broom is quite right, of course, to 
separate ethical decision-making from the scientific study of animal welfare, but as Brunk et al note, this 
model underestimates the role played by values in the assessment process itself. 
Instead, as we have seen, values intrude into the assessment of animal welfare in fundamental ways 
(Tannenbaum 1991; Sandøe & Simonsen 1992; Rollin 1993, 1995). These include: (1) in the value 
frameworks that scientists bring to animal welfare assessment, (2) in deciding what elements are 
inherently versus instrumentally important for animal welfare, (3) in deciding what importance to attach to 
measures that are scientifically respected and can be scored objectively, (4) in cases where data do not 
provide a definite answer to key empirical questions, and (5) in deciding how to weigh incommensurable 
variables and the conflicting interests of different animals. 
Given the many ways that values enter into welfare assessment, it is possible that different sets of values 
will lead to different welfare assessment tools yielding different conclusions, each correct within the given 
value assumptions. Thus, in our case study the European reviewers made a good case that the welfare of 
sows is jeopardised by the gestation stall, given (1) that affective states and an ability to behave in a 
relatively natural way are inherently important for animal welfare, and (2) that it is better to include such 
considerations in assessing welfare than to limit welfare assessment to scientifically uncontroversial 
measures (von Borell et al 1997). At the same time, the Australian reviewers made a good case that 
gestation stalls are not necessarily bad for sow welfare, given a relatively restrictive definition whereby 
welfare boils down to the biological functioning of the animal, and assuming that welfare assessment 
should be restricted to measures that enjoy high credibility in scientific circles (Barnett et al 2001). 
The role of values in welfare assessment does not mean that it is futile to design systems to assess 
animal welfare at the farm and group level. The danger is not that value assumptions will be involved but 
that they will be concealed within a system of assessment which its designers consider to be purely 
objective. In assessing welfare at the farm and group level, we should attempt not the impossible goal of 
eliminating value assumptions from animal welfare assessment, but the achievable goal of making value 
assumptions more explicit so that disagreements can be traced correctly to the underlying value 
differences. 
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